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Abstract
We use two types of cross-country growth regression models to revisit explanations of slow growth
in Africa looking at growth rate variation among African countries only. Both sets of models produce
results that are surprising given conclusions based on global sample: within Africa, we ￿nd greater
coastal population negatively and greater ethnic heterogeneity positively associated with growth,
while distance from the equator is at ￿rst negatively and only later positively associated with growth.
Our results suggest also that institutional and policy variables are endogenous to geographic and
historical factors including the colonizing power and the religious and ethnic make-up of the country.
JEL Classi￿cation: O40, O11, O55, O17
￿This paper draws upon Cinyabuguma￿ s doctoral dissertation completed at Brown University in 2005. He wishes to
thank Herakles Polemarchakis and Oded Galor for their guidance and encouragement. We thank Sean Campbell, David
Weil, Frank Kleibergen, Ki Young Park, Jonathan Temple, Roland Pongou, Paul Collier, Anke Hoe› er, Marcel Fafchamps,
Loukas Balafoutas and the referees and the editor, Augustin Fosu, for valuable suggestions and comments.
01 Introduction
In an early study of the relationship between economic growth and policies, Robert Barro (1991) pointed
out the unsatisfactory nature of dummy variables for Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa (hereafter,
"Africa") that continued to be statistically signi￿cant even when additional controls were incorporated.
This struck Barro and others as problematic because until one knows which economically relevant
features of being located in a region account for its di⁄erent performance, one lacks a full explanation
of what determines growth rates. If we can identify the relevant features and control for them in the
regression, the regional dummies should hold no further explanatory power.
The mystery of the Africa dummy attracted attention in part because of the distressingly poor
economic outcomes recorded in so many African countries in the 1980s and 1990s.1 Easterly and Levine
(1997) suggested that much of the di⁄erence between African and other countries was due to ethnic
heterogeneity, a variable exhibiting some of its highest values in Africa and found by those authors to
negatively impact growth rates in a global sample with a quarter or so of the observations being African.2
While accounting for ethnic heterogeneity alone failed to fully eliminate the Africa dummy from their
regressions, they found that the Africa dummy became insigni￿cant when they added the average growth
rate of neighboring countries. Sachs and Warner (1997) argued that poor growth outcomes in Africa
could be substantially attributed to lack of coastal access, the disease rami￿cations of tropical climates,
and protectionist trade policies. They incorporated these variables in some of their speci￿cations, found
signi￿cant positive e⁄ects of coastal populations and trade openness, and signi￿cant negative e⁄ects of
the fraction of each country￿ s area located within the tropics. In their global sample, the Africa dummy
became insigni￿cant after controlling for these and other factors.
Like those papers, the present paper is concerned with what accounts for the poor economic perfor-
mance of many countries within Africa. Rather than searching for explanations of African di⁄erences
in the context of global cross section regressions, however, we undertake a cross section growth study
taking advantage only of variations within Africa itself. Our goal is to assemble data for more African
countries than have previously been included in such studies, and data for African countries only, to
1The World Bank calculated that the annual growth rate of per capita income between 1985 and 1995 was a negative
1.1% in sub-Saharan Africa, compared to (positive) 0.3% in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2.9% in South Asia, and
7.2% in East Asia and the Paci￿c.
2Subsequent studies have found that the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and economic growth is not
monotonic: having a few major groups contending for power seems to be more harmful than having many small groups,
none of which can hope to dominate the others (Reynal-Querol (2002)). Sachs and Warner (1997) found ethnic heterogene-
ity had no explanatory power in their growth regressions after geographic variables and trade openness are controlled for.
Bockstette et al. (2002) suggest that ethnic heterogeneity is a symptom of late development of intensive agriculture, high
population density, and the state, and ￿nd that the ethnic heterogeneity variable has little or no explanatory power after
controlling for population density and early state formation.
1investigate the prescriptive and descriptive relevance in the African context of the causes of African slow
growth suggested by more global studies. We also apply a novel combination of econometric methods
to strengthen con￿dence in our ￿ndings.
Although data on some variables is missing for some of the sub-Saharan region￿ s 43 countries, it is
possible to assemble a large enough panel data set on growth and its determinants in the 1960-2000
period to derive robust econometric estimates of what accounts for better and worse performance within
the sub-continent. If factors alleged to account for the African di⁄erence in global samples perform
quite di⁄erently within Africa, their relevance to African and other development policy makers would
be called into question. In our study, we ￿nd strong support for the usual positive relationship between
investment rates and growth, and for the standard negative relationship between initial income and
growth, which provides assurance that Africa is not all that di⁄erent from other continents and that
data for the continent￿ s countries is not all that poor. But we were surprised to ￿nd that some of the
main factors that Easterly and Levine (1997) and Sachs and Warner (1997) proposed as explanations
for the African growth di⁄erence had precisely the reverse impacts on di⁄erences in performance within
Africa itself. Ethnic heterogeneity is positively, not negatively, correlated with our growth residuals
and with institutions and policies favoring growth. Countries in our sample were doing better if their
populations lived inland, not near a coast. And rather than being good for growth, being further from
the equator reduced growth rates for about half of the geographic range represented.
We know of a few studies that have worked with country samples exclusively from Africa. Bertocchi
and Canova (2002) used African observations to investigate whether di⁄erent colonizing powers a⁄ected
the subsequent economic performance of the countries they colonized in di⁄erent ways. They found that
this was indeed the case. Savvides (1995) uses a ￿xed e⁄ect framework covering 28 countries (Maghreb
included) with four seven year periods over 1960-87. His study focuses on trade policy and he ￿nds eco-
nomic growth to be correlated with growth in the trade-GDP ratio, investment, initial income, schooling,
and growth of the government. Odjo and Oshikoya (1995) apply OLS and GLS techniques to study the
economic performance of 17 African countries. On average, their ￿ndings contend that investment, ex-
ternal debt, population growth, human capital and proxies for macroeconomic environment signi￿cantly
determine long-run growth in Africa.3 Gyimah-Brempong et al.(1999) explore the relationship between
instability, investment and economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa. Through a dynamic panel approach
they con￿rm the inverse relationship between political instability and economic growth identi￿ed by ear-
3Hadjimichael et al.(1995) focus on the evolution of savings, investment, and net ￿nancial balances of the government
and private sectors. They also evaluate the relative contributions of policy and exogenous factors ￿such as deteriorating
terms of trade ￿to the growth, savings, and investment performance of sub-Saharan African countries, as well as evaluating
the impact of foreign assistance.
2lier studies. Garner (2005) examines whether Acemoglu et al.￿ s ￿reversal of fortunes￿applies to Africa.
He ￿nds, consistent with them, that population density in 1500 is a negative predictor of average country
income today. Gennaioli and Rainer (2005) test the theory that countries whose ethnic groups were more
centrally organized before colonization have better public goods provision, and they ￿nd the evidence
to be supportive. While these analyses are interesting, their focuses are still relatively narrow, and none
check for robustness by using the alternative methodologies which we discuss presently.
We succeeded in assembling a su¢ ciently large data set to generate statistically signi￿cant ￿ndings
with respect to many of the economic, geographic, institutional, and social-historical factors most widely
used as explanatory variables in the empirical growth literature. Since our goal is to obtain results for an
African-only sample with respect to explanatory factors that the general growth literature has viewed as
accountable for ￿ the African di⁄erence,￿we made sure to include the key social and geographic variables
used in the Easterly-Levine and Sachs-Warner studies. Some of the variables studied are available in
cross section only, but others have both cross sectional and time series variation. One strategy we
adopted for dealing with this problem was to conduct a panel data analysis with a GMM model using
variables that change over time and according to country, and then to conduct an OLS regression
analysis of the relationship between the time-invariant variables and the country ￿xed e⁄ects from the
panel regressions.4
A di⁄erent methodological issue leads us to adopt a second method as an alternative to the GMM-
￿xed e⁄ects approach. Some of the historical and geographical variables in our study seem likely to
be exogenous relative to institutional and policy variables that we expected to be more proximate
determinants of growth. To deal with the likely di⁄erences between endogenous and exogenous factors￿
impacts on growth, we estimated a number of two-stage least squares models and tested for endogeneity
and the role of instrumental variables, also carrying out over-identifying restrictions tests (There is
of course an important strand of literature employing instrumental variables procedures to deal with
endogeneity of institutions).5 To the extent possible, we tried to include the same variables in both
our GMM-￿xed e⁄ects analyses and in our 2SLS-IV analyses, so that ￿ndings could be compared and
contrasted, increasing our con￿dence in some of the qualitative ￿ndings.
Like other studies we ￿nd that African economies have grown more slowly when they su⁄ered from
more corruption, more civil wars, less political rights, and less economic openness. However, each of the
4Details on the two-stage GMM dynamic estimation are provided in section 3.1.
5Examples include Mauro￿ s (1995) use of ethno-linguistic fractionalization as an instrument for corruption; Hall and
Jones￿ s (1999) use of language and other instruments for ￿social infrastructure;￿Acemoglu et al.￿ s (2001, 2002) use of settler
mortality and urbanization in 1500 as instruments for political institutions; and Easterly and Levine￿ s (2003) ￿nding that
institutions and policies are proximate channels through which tropical climate, germs and crops have a⁄ected economic
development.
3latter proximate determinants of growth is con￿rmed to be better treated as an endogenous product of
historical and geographic factors than as an exogenous variable. Other ￿ndings include the discovery that
countries in which state-level polities existed in the centuries prior to colonization have performed better
than countries that did not have state-level polities, or in which such polities had been less enduring.
Countries with larger Muslim populations exhibit slower growth. Former British and French colonies
have outperformed former Belgian, Italian or Portuguese colonies. Countries with a high predicted
trade share according to Frankel and Romer (1999) have grown faster than their counterparts with low
predicted trade shares. Having more natural capital has reduced growth rates. We also checked the
robustness of our results to the set of included variables and other factors and ￿nd that most of them
stand up well.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we discuss possible determinants of
economic growth among African economies and introduce the variables used in our growth models. In
Section 3 we introduce the procedure for GMM estimation and OLS analysis of how time-invariant factors
determine country ￿xed e⁄ects, and we also explore our 2SLS-IV models and their results. Section 4
summarizes and concludes the paper.
2 Determinants of Performance
The countries of sub-Saharan Africa occupy a distinctive place in the world economy that emerged
hand in hand with the modern nation-state, industrial technology, and the organizational forms of
modern commerce and ￿nance. Sub-Saharan Africa was the birthplace of humanity and still exhibits
more genetic, cultural, ethnic, and linguistic diversity than any other region of similar size. However,
its burden of tropical climates and disease, and its isolation from the other continents by oceans to
the West and East and the desert to the north, meant that until recent times, foraging and nomadic
peoples coexisted in it with agriculturalists who, in the main, worked small plots of land without the
bene￿t of plows, draught animals, and fertilizer. Their societies were often knit together mainly by
small or decentralized tribes, interspersed among which were various small kingdoms and in a few cases
(e.g. Mali and Ghana), larger empires. While part of the ￿Old World,￿sub-Saharan Africa had such
limited contact with the civilizations of the Mediterranean and Asia that the source of the Nile in
East Africa was still unknown to Europeans more than three centuries after the voyages of Columbus
and Magellan. It was only after Europeans had learned of the malaria-inhibiting powers of quinine that
colonial administrations, the production of tropical export crops, modern mining, and the nation state in
its modern form came to the region. European colonial presence, though in most countries extending less
than seventy years, dramatically a⁄ected African political and economic structures. Decolonization left
4fragile modern infrastructures, oriented mainly toward serving primary export industries, with states
initially manned by thin cadres of educated citizens, funded disproportionately by export taxes and
foreign aid. These infrastructures became highly susceptible to clientalist corruption, ethnic con￿ ict,
and change of government by military coup.6
We expect di⁄erences in economic performance among Africa￿ s countries to be explained by the
same types of geographic and historical factors that account for the region￿ s uniqueness in international
terms. Some of these factors can be treated as ultimate and hence exogenous causes, including equatorial
location, landlocked geography, an ecology conducive to the spread of malaria, and early historical
realities shaped by these factors (i.e. the late appearance of states, their ethno-linguistic diversity, and
the arrival of European colonizers). Others, including the level of corruption in government and the
occurrence of civil wars, will be treated as endogenous, that is as heavily in￿ uenced by the exogenous
variables. The following paragraphs discuss the explanatory variables used by us under the headings
geographic, social and historical, and institutional and policy.7
A ￿rst geographic factor accounted for in our study is proximity to the equator. A dummy variable
for tropical climate is one of the key explanatory variables in Sachs and Warner (1997), but since
such a dummy has less variation within our sample than the absolute latitude measure later used by
Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) and others, it is the latter that we adopt to control for this factor.
The second included variable relates to costs and ease of access to international trade. Sachs and
Warner (1997) argued that being landlocked is one of the major causes of slow growth in many African
countries. It￿ s not clear, however, that coastal access has been bene￿cial in Africa, where ports are
underdeveloped. Also, Nunn (2008) suggests that the slave trade has had lingering e⁄ects on growth
6Analyzing cross-national and sub-national data, Lorentzen, McMillan and Wacziarg (2005) argue that high adult
mortality, exacerbated to some extent by the ongoing AIDS epidemic, explains almost all of Africa￿ s growth tragedy. A
good survey of proposed explanations of African economic performance is provided by Collier and Gunning (1999). Data
from the World Bank and other sources indicate that most sub-Saharan African economies attained positive growth in the
1960￿ s and 1970￿ s and reached their peak per capita GDP in the latter decade. 41% of the countries in our sample had a
per capita income in 1995 that was less than its 1960￿ s level, 35% a 1995 income below their 1970 level, 56% a 1995 income
below their 1980 level, and 62% percent a 1995 income below their 1990 level. Only six percent of sub-Saharan Africa￿ s
population live in nations with higher per capita income in 1995 than they had ever achieved (Rodrik, 1999). However,
42 of 47 African countries have returned to democratically elected governments between 1990 and 2000 (Barkan, 2002),
growth has resumed and accelerated in many countries during the past few years, and some of the con￿ icts of the past, like
those in Mozambique, Angola and Liberia, have been put to rest.
7Of course, it is not possible to control for every possible factor, so we focus on what we see as core variables in the
general cross-country empirical growth literature, making sure to include the key Sachs-Warner geographic and the key
Easterly-Levine social and historical variables, and avoiding variables for which past data are limited for our African sample.
We use the secondary enrolment ratio rather than the schooling attainment variables used by Easterly-Levine because more
African observations are available for it. We use the investment to GDP ratio whereas Easterly-Levine use the ratio of
￿nancial system assets to GDP. While not separately controlling for the Black Market Premium like Easterly-Levine, we
use the Sachs-Warner Years Open variable which incorporates the size of that premium in its de￿nition. For manageability,
we choose one only from sets of closely related variables (for example, absolute latitude instead of a tropical dummy). We
leave out the Easterly-Levine assassinations measure but study another indicator of political stability, Civil Wars. A list
of all included variables, their de￿nitions, and the data sources, appears in Appendix 1.
5via its e⁄ects on social structure and cohesion, and we note that coastal areas were more a⁄ected by it
than those further inland. We tried both a dummy variable for being landlocked and the measure by
Gallup, Sachs with Mellinger (1999) of the proportion of the population living within 100 kilometers of
an ice-free coast; we present results with the latter (called Coast Pop. Shr.), which were more frequently
signi￿cant. A third geographic variable is included to test the hypothesis that having more natural
resources constitutes, however surprisingly, a ￿curse￿(perhaps because it leads to rent-seeking rather
than investment promoting policies, or because it contributes to civil wars and other forms of political
instability). Sachs and Warner (1997) included for this purpose the share of primary product exports in
GDP, but this seems inadequate, since a high primary export share is as likely to be a consequence as a
cause of underdevelopment. We use instead the measure of natural capital developed by the World Bank
(1997), which is more exogenous. A fourth variable relates more directly to disease and in particular
malaria. Using malaria incidence measures is inadequate because economic development exerts reverse
causal in￿ uence upon the incidence of malaria, so we instead use the malaria ecology measure from
Kiszewski et al.(2004).8 Finally, we included a measure of the degree to which geography, as opposed
to policy, favors trade: the trade share predicted by a gravity model that uses a country￿ s population
and geographical features (Pred. Trd. Shr.) only, from Frankel, Romer and Cyrus (1996)￿ sometimes
called ￿natural openness.￿ 9
Our models include several potential social and historical determinants of country economic perfor-
mance that can be treated as exogenous when looking at post-1960 growth. We have noted Easterly and
Levine￿ s (1997) attribution of Africa￿ s "growth tragedy" to ethnic heterogeneity, but other papers have
suggested that high degrees of heterogeneity may be associated with less, not more, inter-ethnic con-
￿ ict (Reynal-Querol, 2002), and heterogeneity creates opportunities for specialization, competition, and
trade that are potentially bene￿cial. We considered several alternative measures of ethnic heterogeneity,
fragmentation, or polarization, ultimately settling on the principal measure from Easterly and Levine
(1997), which is the average of ￿ve di⁄erent indices of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity.10 Religious con￿ icts
may also be important in some countries, for example Nigeria and the Sudan. We include two alter-
native religious measures￿ religious fractionalization and religious polarization￿ used by Reynal-Querol
8Malaria ecology provides an instrument for malaria risk that controls for the fact that causation may run not only
from malaria to income but also from income to malaria. According to Kiszewski et al. (2004), the basic formula for ME
includes temperature, species abundance, and vector type. "Because ME is built upon climatological and vector conditions
on a country-basis, it is exogenous to public health interventions and economic conditions".
9Frankel and Romer (1999) and Frankel et al.(1996) point out that openness, as a policy variable, matters for economic
development. They use the country￿ s natural propensity to trade, based on the gravity model, as instrument for openness.
In the gravity model, predicted trade between two countries goes up with the area and population size of the trading
partner and down with the distance between two countries.
10We decided against the simultaneous inclusion of alternative indicators of the ethnic structure, such as including both
an ethnic heterogeneity and an ethnic polarization measure, because of their relatively high correlations with one another.
6(2002). In addition, following Sala-i-Martin (1997) and others, we use shares of the population classi￿ed
as adherents of major religions, for purposes of our sample using share Muslim and share Catholic.11
Another potential historical determinant of growth that we included, following Bertocchi and Canova
(2002), is the colonizing power, grouped as Eng. Col. (English colony dummy), Fr. Col. (French colony
dummy), or other Col. (Other colony dummy).12 We take from Hall and Jones (1999) a measure of
the fraction of the population speaking one of the ￿ve primary Western European languages (including
English) as mother language (Eur. Lng. Shr.), and the fraction of the population speaking English
(Eng. Lng. Shr.) as a ￿rst language.13 Finally, we include a measure of the early development of
societies proposed by Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman (2002), an index of the depth of experience
with state-level polities since 1 C.E. (Statehist01).14
We consider ￿ve main indicators of institutional quality, political stability, and policy. We anticipate
that these factors may signi￿cantly a⁄ect economic performance, but they may also be endogenous to
some or all of the geographic and social-historical factors mentioned above. The ￿rst two measures
concern the concentration of power and the level of political freedom. These are the Political Openness
variable from the Polity IV dataset,15 and the Political Rights measure compiled by Freedom House.16
The third variable is a political stability indicator. Because the economies of a number of African polities
are well known to have su⁄ered severely from civil wars, we include the civil wars indicator from Collier
11Although not all of the remainder of Africans are considered Protestant, we tried speci￿cations that include the shares
of all three major religions simultaneously and found them to perform poorly, perhaps because the three are so nearly
exhaustive for so many countries. We note that among twenty-two variables found to signi￿cantly predict economic growth
in Sala-i-Martin￿ s cross-country regressions, "fraction Confucian" and "fraction Muslim" are numbers 3 and 5, respectively,
with "fraction Protestant," "fraction Buddhist" and "fraction Catholic" also making the list.
12Like Bertocchi and Canova, we assign former colonies to the country that ruled them longest. The former German
colonies ￿Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Cameroon and Togo ￿were divided among the countries that took them over after
WWI. Burundi and Rwanda are assigned to Belgium, while Tanzania goes to Britain. Though Cameroon and Togo were
jointly mandated by France and Britain, we list Togo and Cameroon under France alone since the British part of Togo was
annexed to Ghana, and Cameroon is currently in the CFA-franc zone; while Somalia is placed under Italy. One country in
our sample, Liberia, is listed as never colonized and accordingly none of the three colonial power dummies is applied to it.
13We take care not to use both variables in the same speci￿cation.
14Some African countries, for example Zambia, were apparently without kingdoms, states or empires until the 19
th
century, while others, for example Nigeria, contained kingdoms as early as the 8
th century. Statehist01 sums values for
half centuries, ranging from 0 for no state to 50 for an indigenous polity covering most of the present territory, and uses a
discount rate of 1% per half century before the most recent included period, 1901-1950. Bockstette et al. (2002) interpret
statehist as an indicator of pre-modern development and ￿nd in a global sample that countries with higher statehist values
grew more rapidly from 1960 to 1995 (See also Putterman and Weil, forthcoming.). We use a revised and expanded version
of their data set (see Putterman, 2004).
15Polit. Open. measures directly the limits of executive power. It was provided by the Polity IV data set and used
by Azam and Hoe› er (2002). The score ranges from 0 to 10, where 10 denotes a highly open regime. We also tried the
ICRG80 and Kaufman et al.(1999) variables as measures of political institutions but due to poor coverage of our sample,
the results were not reliable and are not shown in the paper.
16The index of political freedom around the world has been published by Freedom House since 1972. The survey consists
of a series of questions grouped under political rights and civil liberties, and each country or territory is given a numerical
score for each category. The average scores are used to assign each country the status of ￿free￿ , ￿partially free￿ , or ￿not
free￿ . A score of 7 corresponds to countries enjoying the greatest freedom and a score of 1 to those enjoying the least
freedom.
7and Hoe› er (2002). Fourth, as an indicator of quality of institutions we use an index for corruption
(Mauro, 1995), measuring the abuse of o¢ ce for private gain. Fifth, anticipating that trade openness
may be an important determinant of economic growth as found by Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997), we
adopt their Years Open measure, treating it as a quasi-institutional or policy variable and using our
estimates to investigate the in￿ uence that geography and history have exerted upon it.17
Although factors explaining relative growth outcomes may be expected to operate much the same
way within Africa as in the world as a whole, the values of some of the main variables included in
our study are distributed rather di⁄erently for African countries than for countries in the world as a
whole. To see this, we found the highest and lowest values of our focal variables for samples of up to 154
countries including the 39 in our African sample. We then divided the observed ranges into ten bands of
equal width. We found that while 29 of the 39 African countries are situated in the top four bands for
Ethnic Heterogeneity, the same is true for only 25 of 115 non-African countries for which that measure
is available. For Coastal Population share, while the rest of the world￿ s countries have a bi-modal
distribution with modes in both the 0 ￿10% and the 90 ￿100% bands, the distribution among African
countries is uni-modal, with the only mode at 0 ￿10% and with only one country in our African sample
having 70% or more of its population near a coast. For Absolute Latitude, when we treat maximum
observed country latitude world-wide as 100% and break the distances from the equator to that latitude
into ten bands of equal width, we see that all African countries, being located within 40o north or south
of the equator, fall into the ￿rst ￿ve bands, with 38 of the 39 sample countries being in the ￿rst four
bands. The world sample naturally exhibits a broader range, with 56 of the 113 non-African countries
for which we have data falling in the top ￿ve bands. The Openness, Corruption, and per capita GDP
measures all have broader distributions in the non-African than in the African countries. Histograms of
the respective distributions can be seen in Part I of our Supplemental Appendix (available on request).
These di⁄erences in distribution will be pertinent to our explanation for at least one of the anomalies
that turn up in our analysis.
We study the determinants of economic growth in the framework of models in which the growth rate
of per capita GDP is the dependent variable, and the set of explanatory variables includes initial GDP
per capita (iGDPpc), average investment ratio (I/GDP), and a measure of human capital, the secondary
school enrollment ratio (Sec. Enrol.).18 To address the fact that some important explanatory variables
17The Sachs-Warner index measures the fraction of years during the period 1960 to 1994 that the economy has been
open. A country was open if (i) non-tari⁄ barriers covered less than 40 percent of trade, (ii) average tari⁄ rates were less
than 40 percent, (iii) the black market premium was less than 20 percent during the 1970s and 1980s, (iv) the country
was not classi￿ed as socialist, and (v) the government did not monopolize major exports. Sala-i-Martin (1997) used the
Openness variable to check for robustness, and found that the Sachs-Warner measure of openness is among the variables
which are robust and correlated with growth. The variable is also used by Hall and Jones (1999).
18The three variables are treated as core explanatory variables in the sensitivity analysis of Levine and Renelt (1992).
8are time-invariant, Section 3 uses a two-step procedure, estimating a GMM growth regression with the
time-varying variables, then estimating OLS regressions in which the time-invariant variables explain
that regression￿ s residuals. Section 4 addresses a di⁄erent distinction among the explanatory variables,
estimating a set of two-stage least squares models that take into account the fact that institutional
variables like corruption and civil wars may be endogenous to historical and geographical variables like
proximity to the equator and colonizing power. Commonality of major ￿ndings across the estimates
based on these di⁄erent procedures helps to validate the robustness of our results.
3 GMM and IV Models
3.1 GMM and Residuals Analysis
We have data for all or most of the variables used in this study for up to 33 out of 43 sub-Saharan African
countries for all or part of the period from 1960 to 2000.19 We organize our data on growth rates and on
the other variables for which measures are available into eight half-decade observation periods, for 1960-
64, 1965-69, etc. (Appendix 2 reports summary statistics of our data.). With some country observations
missing for some sub-periods, this gives us up to a maximum of 200 observations in total, with between 5
and 8 observations for most countries (see Appendix 3). Rather than simply pooling these observations,
we have made precise estimates of the explanatory variables￿e⁄ects by controlling for country and period
speci￿c e⁄ects. But some variables, including most of the geographic and historical factors, do not vary
with time. We deal with this by means of a two step GMM: ￿rst, we use the generalized method of
moments to estimate variants of the growth equation, including some additional time-variant factors,
and then we estimate OLS regressions in which the extracted ￿xed e⁄ects for each included country
are dependent variables and various sets of time-invariant factors are explanatory variables. Our core
results (as in Caselli et al.(1996) and Hoe› er (2002)) are based on the following speci￿cation:
gi;t = ￿ + ￿yi;t￿1 + ￿xi;t + ￿wi + ’￿t + ￿i + ￿i;t: (3.1.1)
The ￿xed e⁄ects (which may contain both time-and country [observed and unobserved]- speci￿c com-
ponents ) is extracted as20
^ ￿it ￿ (gi;t ￿ ^ ￿ ￿ ^ ￿yi;t￿1 ￿ ^ ￿xi;t ￿ ’￿t) = (￿wi + ￿i) + ￿i;t; (3.1.2)
19We study sub-Saharan Africa, thus excluding countries bordering the Mediterranean due to their di⁄erent histories
and cultures. Because of its domination by its white minority until the mid-1990s and the resulting di⁄erences between its
economy and those of other sub-Saharan countries, we also excluded South Africa from our study. These decisions were
taken for conceptual reasons before we began our research, and we do not investigate whether results di⁄er for a di⁄erently
de￿ned region (for instance, Africa as a whole, continental Africa without island nations, etc.).
20The two step procedure was also applied in Hoe› er (2002), Blanchlower, Oswald and Sanfey (1996) and Battese and
Coelli (1995).
9where gi;t is the average growth rate in country i during ￿ve year period t, yi;t￿1 denotes the log of income
per capita at the beginning of each of these periods, and xi;t is the subset of exogenous explanatory
variables that vary over time. A further ingredient accounted for in all our regressions is the set of time
dummies, ￿t.21 ￿i accounts for the unobserved country speci￿c e⁄ects, wi represents measured time-
invariant country characteristics and ￿i;t is the error term. In panel estimation, consistent estimation of
the structural coe¢ cients depends crucially on the stochastic properties of the error term, i.e., whether
they are serially correlated or not.
In this paper we follow Caselli et al.(1996) and Gyimah-Brempong et al. (1999) and we apply
the Arellano-Bond (1991) panel data estimation procedure.22In particular, Caselli et al.(1996), Knight
et al.(1993), and Islam (1995) estimated a neoclassical growth model using panel data methodology
and concluded that single equation models, used to study the determinants of long-run growth, were
misleading as they produced biased and inconsistent estimates. They argued that the endogeneity of
some of the regressors and the unobserved country speci￿c e⁄ects problems were not addressed when
single equations and cross-country data were used.23 In addition, with endogenous regressors and country
characteristics, the Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic panel estimator performs better.24
Since the measured country characteristics wi may be correlated with the unobserved country-speci￿c
e⁄ects ￿i and/or the error term vi;t, the model given by equation (3.1.1) reduces to:25
gi;t = ￿ + ￿yi;t￿1 + ￿xi;t + ’￿t + ￿￿
i + vi;t; (3.1.3)
where ￿￿
i = ￿i+￿wi, and vi;t is i.i.d. with mean zero and a constant variance and, in particular, E(vit) =
E(vitvis) = 0 for s 6= t: Equation (3.1.3), because of its endogenous regressors and/or its dynamic
nature, implies correlation of error term with regressors, thus violating the orthogonality condition. The
di⁄erenced GMM procedure allows one to obtain a consistent estimator (^ ￿; ^ ￿; ^ ’) for ￿; ￿ and ’:26 These
21We have one dummy for each ￿ve-year period. The estimated coe¢ cients from time dummies will not be shown in our
tables to save space.
22Arellano and Bond￿ s (1991) estimation requires that the variables be measured as deviations from their period means
and that the equations be estimated in di⁄erenced form. Because of the endogeneity and the correlation with the error
term, an instrumental variable estimator is called for. In fact, the Arellano-Bond ￿rst-di⁄erenced GMM is an IV estimator
that uses past values of the explanatory variables as well as all strictly exogenous variables as instruments.
23Other studies have employed cross-section procedures to study the determinants of long run growth (Mankiw, Romer
and Weil (1992), Barro (1997), Levine and Renelt (1992), Sala-i-Martin (1997) and King and Levine (1993)); Hoe› er
(2002), Ojo and Oshikoya (1995) observe that there is a loss of information associated with the use of a single (average)
observation; Caseli et al.(1996) indicate that Cross-country estimator is only consistent under restrictions that individual
￿xed-e⁄ects are uncorrelated with the other right-hand-side variables.
24A large number of techniques including GLS, the within group estimator (FE), and the GMM estimator (Chamberlain,
1983) have also been proposed.
25We assume that yi;t￿1 and xit are predetermined for vit in the sense that E(vit jyi;t￿1;xit) = 0; 8t :
26A problem with the original Arellano-Bond (1991) estimator is that lagged levels are often poor instruments for ￿rst
di⁄erences, especially for variables that are highly persistent, such that the data series have near unit root properties.
In such cases, as one of our referees pointed out, a possible response is to implement system GMM (Blundell and Bond,
10consistent estimates are plugged into equation (3.1.2) to extract the residuals of the growth regression.
These residuals are then regressed on the time-invariant country characteristics, wi; as:27
gi;t ￿ ^ ￿ ￿ ^ ￿yi;t￿1 ￿ ^ ￿xi;t ￿ ’￿t = ￿ + ￿1wi + ￿i;t: (3.1.4)
3.1.1 First Stage Regressions for GMM Models
Table 1 presents the results of the ￿rst-stage dynamic GMM estimator. The growth rate of per capita
income is the dependent variable and independent variables are conventional time-variant economic
variables (iGDPpc, I/GDP, Sec. Enrol.), institutional variables (including an indicator of civil wars and
institutional quality index), and time dummies. We present four alternate speci￿cations, three of which
drop one or another of the last three explanatory variables to check the robustness of results and to
allow for the inclusion of country observations otherwise excluded due to missing data.28 Table 1 also
presents a ￿rst ￿and a second ￿order serial correlation test, as well as the Sargan test of over-identifying
restrictions. It additionally presents Wald test statistics for the signi￿cance of the regressors. These
tests determine the correctness of the dynamic GMM estimator used here. A key condition exploited
in this analysis is the absence of serial correlation among the error terms. After examining our results,
we found negative ￿rst order correlation in the residuals. The M1 statistic rejects the null hypothesis of
lack of ￿rst order-serial correlation between error terms, validating our conjecture that the error term
contains country speci￿c e⁄ects.29 However, the M2 statistic in Table 1 fails to reject the null of lack of
second-order autocorrelation in the ￿rst-di⁄erence residuals in all speci￿cations.30
1998). Following Gindling, et al., (2008) we regressed the growth rate of GDP per capita on its lagged value, controlling
for country ￿xed e⁄ects, to assess whether our data su⁄er from this problem. With a coe¢ cient on the lagged variable of
0.196 (signi￿cant at the 1% level), we found no indication that our data are highly persistent nor that the Arellano and
Bond (1991) estimator is biased. We conclude that system GMM is not called for.
27We assume that the errors are independent across countries and serially uncorrelated for the coe¢ cients on country
characteristics to be consistent.
28Perhaps due to the modest sample size and the small number of observations for some countries, the maximum number
of lags for independent variable which gives good results in this model is one.
29The fact that the error term contains country speci￿c characteristics is a strong argument for the use of the second-
stage GMM procedure. The Sargan tests of over-identifying restrictions are rejected in all four speci￿cations that use the
dynamic GMM estimation.
30Test statistics and p-values for the ￿rst and second order autocorrelation in residuals are given by M1 and M2 re-
spectively and are distributed as standard normal. The M2 statistic tests for lack of second-order serial correlation in the
￿rst-di⁄erence residuals. This is the case if the errors in the model in levels are not serially correlated, but also if the errors
in levels follow a random-walk process (Arellano and Bond 1991). The M1 statistic however tests for lack of ￿rst-order
serial correlation in the di⁄erenced residuals. Since (vit ￿ vit￿1) is the ￿rst di⁄erence of serially uncorrelated errors, M1
need not be statistically zero; but the consistency of the GMM estimators hinges heavily upon the assumption that M2=0.
11Table 1: First Stage Regressions for GMM Models
Dependent variable: Growth rate of GDP per capita (Gr(GDPpc))


























































# Obs. 136 136 141 190





















Note: Entries for variables in this table are estimated coe¢ cients followed by standard errors,
in parentheses, and *, **and *** indicate signi￿cance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively.
Turning to the estimates, the coe¢ cients on the initial GDP per capita are negative and signi￿cant
at the 5 percent level in all four speci￿cations. The estimated speed of convergence is about 3:5 percent
per annum. The investment share of GDP is highly signi￿cant (p < 0:001) and positive in all speci-
￿cations, with an average coe¢ cient of 5:09. The coe¢ cient on secondary enrollment is negative and
quite insigni￿cant in all three speci￿cations that include it, and since data for it are missing for a large
number of countries, we drop the variable both from the ￿nal speci￿cation of Table 1 and from the
2SLS estimates of section 3.2. Civil wars is signi￿cant at the 5 and 10 percent level with the anticipated
signs in two of the three regressions in which it is included. The coe¢ cient on political openness is of
of the expected sign and is signi￿cant at the 5 and 10 percent level in columns 1 and 2, respectively.
The coe¢ cient on civil wars implies that an increase of one standard deviation in civil wars directly
decreases economic growth by 0:24 standard deviations, a 0:60% change in growth rate when political
12openness and schooling are controlled for in our GMM speci￿cation, and by 0:16 standard deviations, a
0:40% change in growth rate, when only schooling is controlled for in our GMM speci￿cation. This is
a relatively large e⁄ect compared to the average growth for the sample period (1960 ￿ 2000) of about
0:73%.31 These results provide support for the view that institutional problems, especially civil wars,
were important proximate causes of slow growth in Sub-Saharan African countries.32
3.1.2 Second Stage Regressions for GMM Residuals
In the second stage, we estimate OLS regressions, with clustered standard errors at the country level, on
the time-invariant variables in our set of potential growth determinants. The dependent variable is the
residual from the column 4 GMM regression, a version chosen because dropping secondary schooling￿
which is not signi￿cant in the other regressions￿ permits a signi￿cant gain in sample size without major
change in other coe¢ cients. The results are shown in Table 2.33 Since the GMM regressions of Table 2
include multiple observations for the same country in di⁄erent periods, the country-speci￿c error terms
extracted from the column 4 regression are in fact country-and-period terms, which we analyze in two
alternatives ways.
31See Tahari et al. (2004). Estimates of the growth rate vary among the columns of Table 1 due to changes in country
coverage, but all are within the narrow range from 0.71% to 0.76%.
32A growing literature on civil wars and economic performance, including recent books by Clement (2005) and by Fosu
and Collier (2005), con￿rms the negative e⁄ects of civil wars on growth in sub-Saharan Africa. Prior to the 1990s, other
forms of political instability, especially coups d￿ etat, were a more common disrupter of political and economic life, with
harm to economic growth shown by scholars including Fosu (2002).
33We need to stress that the coe¢ cients on the ￿xed e⁄ects regression are consistent if and only if all the country
characteristics are uncorrelated with the unobserved county speci￿c e⁄ects. This is, however, a strong restriction, which
would hold only in very rare cases. We shall thus regard these results with caution, as in Hoe› er 2002.
13Table 2: Second Stage Regressions for GMM Residuals
Dependent Variable: GMM Residuals































































































R2 0:32 0:34 0:43 0:47
# Obs 173 167 140 117
# Countries 30 29 24 20
Note: Entries for variables in this table are estimated coe¢ cients followed by standard errors,
in parentheses, and*, **and *** indicate signi￿cance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively.
First, columns 1 ￿4 of Table 2 report regressions in which a given country can be represented by
several observations because the dependent variable￿ an error term from the GMM estimate￿ di⁄ers
across periods, although the explanatory variables do not. We provide four separate regression estimates
because variables added, by turns, in columns 2, 3 and 4 cause reductions in sample size, due to missing
14values. Second, in regressions not reported in Table 2 we run a cross section version of our ￿xed e⁄ects
OLS regression, in which the single observation per country uses as dependent variable the average of the
error terms for that country from the period-speci￿c observations in Table 1.34 The results are similar,
although the standard errors on the cross-section regressions were somewhat larger. In both the Table 2
regressions and its cross section variant, we ￿nd that coe¢ cients on many of the variables representing
time invariant characteristics are signi￿cant at the 1% level, with a few others being signi￿cant at the
5% or 10% levels.
The estimates for two of the geographic measures deserve particular attention. First, after exper-
imenting with both a linear and a quadratic speci￿cation, we ￿nd that the latter performs best for
latitude, and that the signi￿cant coe¢ cients and their signs reverse ￿ndings, based on world samples,
that countries further from the equator grow faster. In particular, the signi￿cant positive coe¢ cients
on latitude means that all else equal, growth slows as a country￿ s latitude increases to about 9￿ north
or south of the equator. Although the negative coe¢ cients on latitude squared eventually predominate,
the predicted growth rate becomes higher than at the equator only for countries located at at least 17
- 19 degrees latitude, which means that latitude is disadvantageous to growth over most of the tropical
zone. Second, the surprising negative and signi￿cant coe¢ cients (p < 0:01) on the Coast Pop. Shr.
variable are contrary to Sachs and Warner (1997)￿ s ￿nding (see also Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger, 1999)
that countries in the vicinity of an ocean or an ocean-navigable river tend to grow faster than landlocked
countries. Our result suggests that, among African countries, those close to the ocean did not grow any
faster than those further from it, and indeed, performed worse. The size of the coe¢ cient implies that
Coast Pop. Shr. would have a large impact on economic development.
Turning to other geographic variables, the coe¢ cient on log of predicted trade share (Pred. Trd. Shr.)
is positive and signi￿cant in the country e⁄ect estimates that include it. Malaria ecology is included in
three of the regressions but is never signi￿cant and has inconsistent signs. The natural capital measure,
inclusion of which reduces the sample size somewhat, is included in regression 3 and obtains a negative
coe¢ cient signi￿cant at the 10% level, consistent with a now familiar ￿nding for global samples.
Turning to the social and historical variables, we ￿nd positive and signi￿cant coe¢ cients on state-
hist01, indicating that countries with long histories of polities above the tribal level tended to have
faster growth than those without such histories, all else being equal. The coe¢ cients on ethno-linguistic
fractionalization (Eth. Heter.) are all highly signi￿cant, and their sign contrary to that found by East-
erly and Levine (1997) for the related ethnic fractionalization measure.35 The included religion variable
34See Hoe› er, 2002 for a detailed discussion on these issues.
35We also estimated versions of the four regressions in which we include both ethnic heterogeneity and its square. Because
both terms obtained signi￿cant coe¢ cients in only one of the speci￿cations of Table 2 where it was still not signi￿cantly
15indicates that countries with a large proportion of Muslims achieved signi￿cantly lower levels of growth
than did other African countries.36 We tried including our English, French, and Other Colony dummy
variables in each equation and found that only the English Colony variable ever obtained a signi￿cant
coe¢ cient, which is a positive one in column 4.
Finally, of our ￿ve institution or policy measures, three lack time series variation over the period
studied, and thus appear as explanatory variables in the second stage regressions. We include only one in
a given regression because of their related natures and unavailability for di⁄erent sub-sets of countries.
Political Rights and Years Open show weakly signi￿cant positive relationships with the residuals in
columns 2 and 3 respectively. Absence of Corruption has an insigni￿cant negative coe¢ cient in equation
4.
3.2 2SLS and IV Regression
One of the drawbacks of the method used in the previous section is that it fails to distinguish between
variables that are clearly exogenous to the current policy environment and the current performance of
institutions and the economy, and variables that may be in￿ uenced by them. While a country￿ s latitude,
its ethnic makeup, and the power that colonized it in the nineteenth century cannot possibly have been
in￿ uenced by its adoption of trade openness or experience of civil wars in recent times, the reverse could
easily be the case.
In this section we reanalyze our data, taking as the pivot of our methodology a distinction between
endogenous and exogenous variables, rather than between time-variant and time-invariant variables. We
estimate a set of two-stage least squares regression models in which geographic and historical variables
are used as instruments to predict civil wars, trade openness, political rights, political openness, and
corruption, presenting only those results that pass tests for both the endogeneity of the latter variables
and for over-identifying restrictions.
3.2.1 Identi￿cation Methodology
Assuming that the unobserved country characteristics, ￿i; are not signi￿cant and using measured geo-
graphical and social-historical factors as instruments, our 2SLS-IV regression systems follow this system
preferred at the 5% level according to a Ramsey test, and to maintain comparability across our estimates and with those of
others, we show estimates with the level term only (but these alternate estimates and test statistics are shown in Appendix
4). A quadratic speci￿cation for ethnic heterogeneitiy that allows us to make inferences about the range of values over
which its e⁄ect is positive is included among our 2SLS estimates, below.
36This result contrasts with Sala-i-Martin (1997)￿ s ￿nding that the proportion of Muslims is positively correlated with
growth of GDP per capita in regressions using world samples. We also tried including % Catholic but found that it obtained
insigni￿cant coe¢ cients.
16of equations:
gi;t = ao + a1Yi;t + a2Xi;t + vi;t;
Yi;t = bo + b1Zi;t + b2Xi;t + "i;t;
(3.2.1)
where X is a set of exogenous controls, which act directly on the outcome, and Y is a vector of endogenous
institutional and policy variables, while Z is a vector of time-variant and time-invariant exogenous
instruments, and "i;t is an error term. In this speci￿cation, the Z vector is being used to instrument for
the set of endogenous variables contained in the Y vector.37
Our identi￿cation methodology includes the assumptions that the instruments should be uncorrelated
with the error term, E(Zi;tvi;t) = 0; should not in￿ uence the independent variable by themselves,
E(Zi;tgi;t) = 0; but can in￿ uence the growth rate through their e⁄ect on institutions and policies,
E(Yi;tZi;t) 6= 0. Under these assumptions, we can use instrumental variable estimation, provided that
there is at least one instrument for each endogenous variable.
Our 2SLS systems are speci￿ed by ￿rst dividing the potential determinants of the rate of growth of
GDP per capita (which is the dependent variable of our 2nd stage regressions) into three sets: (a) direct
determinants of the growth rate, consisting of initial GDP per capita, I/GDP, the coastal population
share, natural capital, and malaria ecology, (b) endogenous institutional and policy variables (civil wars,
years open, political rights, political openness and absence of corruption), and (c) potential instruments,
which we hypothesize may be determinants of the endogenous variables but not direct determinants of
growth, consisting of predicted trade share, latitude, latitude squared, ethnic heterogeneity and in one
instance its square, state history, colonizing power (Britain, France, or Other), religious fractionaliza-
tion, European language share, and two religious a¢ liation variables￿ % Muslim, and % Catholic.38 We
then attempted to estimate a separate 2SLS regression system for each of the ￿ve endogenous variables
37A drawback of the 2SLS approach adopted in this section is that it is di¢ cult to control for country ￿xed e⁄ects when
some of the instruments, other explanatory variables, and even some of the instrumented institutional and policy variables
take only one value for each country (i.e., are time invariant). Such variables drop out if values are taken as di⁄erences
from country means, and manual inclusion of country dummy variables proved impossible without dropping some elements
of the model. We therefore proceed on the assumption that relevant country characteristics are adequately captured by
the values of the time-invariant measures, which include latitude, ethnic heterogeneity, and coastal population share.
38We experimented with a quadratic speci￿cation for ethnic heterogeneity including both level and square terms, adopting
the quadratic speci￿cation whenever the joint signi￿cance of the coe¢ cients on the two terms is 5% or less, a Ramsey test
indicates an improvement of speci￿cation over the alternative with only ethnic heterogeneity (level term) at the 5% level or
less, and the test results for instruments (over-identi￿cation and endogeneity) for the 2SLS equation system are satisfactory.
These criteria were met in all cases by the quadratic speci￿cation for latitude. The ￿rst two criteria were also met in the
￿rst-stage regressions for Political Rights and Political Openness. However, the third criterion is met by a speci￿cation
without ethnic heterogeneity squared but not when the square term is included, so in Table 3 we show a quadratic
speci￿cation for Ethnic heterogeneity in the ￿rst stage regression for Political Openness only, although the coe¢ cients in
the quadratic ￿rst stage estimate are mentioned in our later remarks about a possible convex e⁄ect of ethnic heterogeneity
and the estimates are displayed in Appendix 4. Coastal population share, natural capital, and malaria ecology, although
potentially as exogenous as the variables in set (c), were grouped in set (a) because tests showed them to have direct e⁄ects
on the growth rate in numerous speci￿cations.
17(b), selecting an appropriate speci￿cation for each two-equation system by investigating which set of the
potential instruments satis￿es the criteria that (i) the instruments successfully predict the relevant en-
dogenous variable, as indicated by passing Wu-Hausman and Durban-Wu-Hausman tests of endogeneity,
(ii) the instruments also pass the Cragg-Donald weak instruments test, and (iii) the instruments can be
excluded from the 2nd stage regression, as indicated by the system passing the Sargan and Basmann
tests of over-identifying restrictions.39 The procedure followed in each case was to ￿rst estimate the
relevant two-equation system including all potential instruments (c), then if one or more test results
were unsatisfactory, repeat the procedure dropping in turn each of the potential instruments, and con-
tinuing to drop additional potential instruments until satisfactory results were obtained on all tests.40
When tests (iii) suggested that one or more potential instruments could not in fact be excluded from
a 2nd stage regression, we re-estimated the system with that variable included in both the 1st and the
2nd stage regression, resulting in two variables that are instruments in most of the 2SLS systems being
included in both regressions when political rights is the included endogenous variable.41
3.2.2 2SLS Regression Results
Tables 3a and 3b show pairs of 1st- and 2nd-stage regressions for our ￿ve endogenous institutional and
policy variables, beginning with Civil Wars. The ￿rst equation of each pair is the predicting equation
39In principle, all ￿ve endogenous variables could be included in a single growth regression. However, correlations between
them and the problem of selecting a few identifying instruments for each of them make this quite di¢ cult. We therefore
include only one endogenous variable in each 2SLS system. To be sure, the claim that a given instrumental variable a⁄ects
economic growth only through a particular institutional or policy variable, as is required by any one of the 2SLS systems,
may be thrown into question by the appearance of that same variable as an instrument in another of our 2SLS systems.
For this reason, we interpret each 2SLS system as a free-standing attempt to understand how di⁄erent exogenous and
institutional variables have a⁄ected economic growth in Africa. Put di⁄erently, each of the ￿ve institutional and policy
variables is treated as one of several alternative indicators of the quality of the institutional environment in the sample
countries, and the relationships among these ￿ve variables is not explored here. We brie￿ y summarize provisional tests of
the relative importance of the ￿ve variables in a ￿nal footnote of this subsection.
40If dropping only one variable proved insu¢ cient, we tentatively removed whichever variable had shown the largest
improvement in the criteria and tried each possible second variable, and so on. When following this procedure, we treated
latitude and latitude squared as one variable, always dropping either both or neither of the two.
41A referee suggested that three factors treated as exogenous in our IV estimates￿ ethnic heterogeneity, late appearance
of states, and colonizing power￿ may be in￿ uenced by other explanatory variables such as latitude and coastal population
share, and thus themselves may be endogenous within the setting of our 1st stage regressions. We investigated this by
estimating a set of regressions in which a colonizer dummy, Ethnic Heterogeneity, or Statehist01 is the dependent variable
and the explanatory variables are malaria ecology, natural capital, % Muslim, and absolute latitude. The only signi￿cant
coe¢ cients we found were for % Muslim, which is positive and signi￿cant at the 5% level in the equation for Statehist01,
and Malaria Ecology, which is positive and signi￿cant at the 5% level in the equation for Ethnic Heterogeneity. These
correlations are of some interest in their own right: the appearance of states and of Islam were historically connected in
the Sahel zone, while prevalence of malaria may have been related to low population density and absence of state building
which tend to go along with the survival of numerous distinct linguistic identities. However, it is not feasible to treat 1st
stage regressors as instruments, the correlations are not so strong as to cause severe multi-colinearity problems, and state
history and ethnic heterogeneity are certainly exogenous to the contemporary institution and policy variables that we study.
Moreover, they possess independent causal impact. For example, in the 1st stage regression for Absence of Corruption,
both Statehist01 and % Muslim have signi￿cant coe¢ cients, but of opposite sign despite the positive correlation between
the two variables. Accordingly, we continue to treat them as instruments when they pass the tests described in the text.
18for the endogenous variable and the second is the growth equation that includes its predicted value.
Table 3a:First and Second Stage Regressions for IV Models
Dependent Variable.



















































































































































Adjusted R2 0.16 0.02 0.45 0.22 0.38 -0.06
# Obs. 191 191 191 191 138 138
# Countries 24 24 24 24 23 23
19Table 3b:First and Second Stage Regressions for IV Models
Dependent Variable.







































































































Uncentered R2 0.41 0.23 0.88 0.35
# Obs. 193 193 136 136
# Countries 25 25 17 17
Note: Entries for variables in this table are estimated coe¢ cients followed by standard errors,
in parentheses, and*, **and *** indicate signi￿cance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively.
Each of the institutional and policy variables is well predicted by its instruments, and each proves
20to be a signi￿cant determinant of growth at either the 5% or the 1% level. Of the ￿ve variables, Civil
Wars is a negative while Years Open, Political Rights, Political Openness and Absence of Corruption
are positive determinants of growth.
Although each pair of equations constitutes a separate 2SLS system and is estimated independently
of the others, it￿ s convenient to discuss the results as a group, noting how each explanatory variable
a⁄ects growth either directly or via one or more of the endogenous variables. To begin with, the three
major ￿sub-Saharan growth surprises￿of the previous section are all found again in the 2SLS regression
systems. As in Table 2, latitude proves to be detrimental to growth, in this case by negatively impacting
four of the endogenous variables that increase growth.42 Ethnic heterogeneity has a positive coe¢ cient
where it appears in level term only, being insigni￿cant in the Civil Wars regression but showing highly
signi￿cant positive e⁄ects on Political Rights and Absence of Corruption. In the regression for Political
Openness, both Ethnic heterogeneity and its square obtain signi￿cant coe¢ cients, with the positive
coe¢ cient on the square term becoming dominant and implying a positive relationship between ethnic
heterogeneity and growth for values of the former above 0.33, a range in which just over three quarters
of the included countries fall. Coastal population share, which cannot be excluded from any of the
2nd-stage regressions, has negative and non signi￿cant coe¢ cients in all of them. However, it also has
two indirect e⁄ects that seem inconsistent with these ￿ndings: although not an instrument in the proper
sense in either regression, Coastal Pop. Share has a negative and signi￿cant e⁄ect on Civil Wars and a
signi￿cant positive e⁄ect on Absence of Corruption.
Turning to other variables, a positive e⁄ect of a long state history on growth is indicated either
directly or indirectly in three of the ￿ve equation systems: a positive direct e⁄ect, signi￿cant at the 10%
level, in the Political Rights system, and positive e⁄ects on Years Open and Absence of Corruption,
both signi￿cant at the 1% level. Predicted Trade Share is a positive predictor, signi￿cant at the 1%
level, of Years Open, Political Openness, and Absence of Corruption. Of the three colonizing power
dummy variables, only Other Colony showed any signi￿cance and so was included, having signi￿cant
detrimental e⁄ects by increasing Civil Wars and decreasing Yrs Open. Of the religious a¢ liation share
variables, likewise, only % Muslim survived tests for inclusion in the systems, displaying unhelpful
indirect e⁄ects via all ￿ve endogenous variables, but signi￿cant ones only via Political Openness and
Absence of Corruption. European Language Share passes tests for inclusion in three equation systems,
but its coe¢ cient is never signi￿cant. Religious Fractionalization is included as an instrument in all
￿ve systems, showing a signi￿cant positive indirect e⁄ect on growth by increasing Years Open but a
42In the 2SLS system that includes Political Rights, our tests indicated that latitude and its square could not be excluded
from the 2nd-stage equation. Although not instruments in the proper sense, they are nevertheless signi￿cant negative
predictors of Political Rights, with latitude showing a negative but insigni￿cant e⁄ect on growth itself.
21signi￿cant negative indirect e⁄ect by reducing Absence of Corruption.43
Like Coastal Population Share, the Natural Capital and Malaria Ecology variables are included, as
dictated by test results, in all 2nd-stage regressions, which makes their inclusion also in the 1st-stage
regressions as a control conventional. In these cases, the coe¢ cients in both stages are potentially of
interest, since there is no economic reason to rule out e⁄ects via the endogenous variables. Natural
Capital obtains the now-expected negative coe¢ cient in four of the ￿ve 2nd-stage regressions, but is
signi￿cant at the 10% level in only one.44 Malaria Ecology has negative coe¢ cients in all ￿ve 2nd-stage
regressions, but is signi￿cant at the 10% level in one only. Contrary to expectations, Malaria Ecology
appears to have signi￿cantly positive indirect e⁄ects on growth by increasing Absence of Corruption.
Looking ￿nally at the two core economic determinants of the growth rate, both lagged GDP per
capita and the investment share (I/GDP) have their expected signs in all ￿ve 2nd-stage regressions,
with investment share always increasing the growth rate at the 1% level of signi￿cance and lagged GDP
per capita having a negative sign, consistent with convergence, and being signi￿cant in all 2nd-stage
regressions, except that for Civil Wars, at the 10% level or better.
Table 4 presents alternative tests of endogeneity (Wu-Hausman F- test and Durbin-Wu-Hausman
￿2-test), overidentifying restrictions (Sargan N*R-sq test and Basmann test), and of weak instruments
(Cragg-Donald F-test). In all ￿ve 2nd-stage regressions in which an endogenous variable is instrumented,
our results ￿with the exception of one weak instruments test￿ pass all the tests mentioned above.45￿ 46
43Due to concern that the joint presence of Religious Fractionalization and Ethnic Heterogeneity might play a role in the
unexpected coe¢ cients on the latter variable, we also re-ran each equation system dropping Religious Fractionalization.
The results, not shown, are qualitatively unchanged.
44The p-value of the coe¢ cient on Natural Capital in the 2nd stage regression for Civil Wars is 0.102.
45The ￿rst stage regression for political rights fails the Cragg-Donald F-test of weak instruments, with p = 0:13:
46Although determining the relative importance of the ￿ve endogenous institutional variables analyzed in this section is
beyond our objectives for this paper, we undertook some exercises in this vein following the suggestion of one of the referees.
For each of the ten possible pairings of endogenous variables, we estimated two 2SLS equation systems treating not one but
two variables as endogenous. For example, considering the ￿rst two IV equation systems in Table 3a, we estimated a new
system of equations that includes two ￿rst stage regressions, one for Years Open and another for Civil Wars, and a second
stage (growth) regression in which the predicted values of both variables are included as regressors. Two estimates were
done for each pairing of endogenous variables: one in which the instrument set is the union of the two sets of instruments
used for the relevant endogenous variables in Table 3, the other in which the instrument set is the intersection of those
two sets of instruments. We then checked whether one endogenous variable obtained a more signi￿cant coe¢ cient than the
other in the corresponding second stage regressions (compare Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). For all pairings of endogenous
variables, at least one of the two remained statistically signi￿cant with at least one of the two instrument sets, and usually
one endogenous variable was signi￿cant with both sets of instruments. Using this methodology, we found that the variable
Civil Wars was exceeded in signi￿cance by all four of the other endogenous variables and that the variable Political Rights
was exceeded in signi￿cance by each of the three variables other than Civil Wars. There was a less clear-cut relationship
among the three remaining variables, with Years Open exceeding in signi￿cance Absence of Corruption for both large
and small instrument sets but with no clear dominance between Years Open and Political Openness or between Political
Openness and Absence of Corruption. As a further exercise, we estimated 2SLS systems that included three ￿rst stage
equations, one for each of these three variables, again with a maximal (union) and minimal (intersection) set of instruments.
In the second stage (growth) regressions based on both sets of instruments, only Years Open had a statistically signi￿cant
coe¢ cient. The complete results can be viewed in our Supplemental Appendix. A provisional conclusion, therefore, is
that Years Open has the most decisive in￿ uence on growth among the ￿ve institutional variables that we study, while the












































































































Note: Overid. stands for over-identifying restrictions and Endog. stands for endogeneity tests. DWH refers to
Durbin-Wu-Hausman ￿2-test, WH refers to Wu-Hausman F-test and C-D refers to Cragg-Donald F-test.
Entries in parentheses are p-values.
in￿ uences of Civil Wars and Political Rights are least important. Since these exercises are not based on careful consideration
of alternative methods, we view them as suggestive, only.
233.3 Consistency of GMM and IV Models, and Robustness
By virtue of the negative and signi￿cant coe¢ cients on initial GDP per capita, our dynamic GMM and
IV technique estimates both con￿rm the usual conditional convergence result, i.e. income is growing
faster in poorer countries, all else being equal. The e⁄ect of the investment/GDP ratio is robustly
positive and signi￿cant in both sets of estimates, with a 1% change in (I/GDP) leading to a 4:5 to 5:4%
change in the GDP growth rate according to the GMM estimates and a 1:9 to 3:5% change in GDP
growth rate according to the IV estimates. Findings with regard to geographic, historical, institutional
and policy variables also show considerable consistency across methods of analysis. We summarize those
￿ndings in Section 4.
Turning to robustness concerns, in all regressions we corrected for heteroskedasticity or implemented
regressions with clustered standard errors at the country level.47 We checked for their robustness to
di⁄erent ways of dealing with the correlation between predicted trade share, coastal population share
and trade openness, and found that our results cannot be explained by these correlations.48
4 Summary and Conclusions
This paper has explored the role of political, social, and geographic factors in explaining economic
performance of countries in sub-Saharan Africa during the years 1960 ￿2000. Our ￿ndings indicate that
initial GDP per capita and the investment share of GDP in￿ uence economic growth in the conventional
manner in sub-Saharan African countries, providing assurance that the data are adequate and that the
laws of economics hold south of the Sahara as elsewhere. But the available measure of human capital
(average schooling) is never signi￿cant and always has a negative sign. We also con￿rm that a variety of
other variables help to explain performance in sub-Saharan Africa. These include institutional and policy
variables (civil wars, economic openness, political rights, political openness and corruption), geographic
47The exception with regard to displaying results with cluster standard errors at the country level are the 2
nd-stage
regressions in Tables 3a and 3b, which do not correct for heteroskedasticity because the endogeneity and over-identifying
restrictions tests, which are fundamental to our results, cannot be obtained if we correct for heteroskedasticity there.
48We were worried about a possible correlation between predicted trade share, coastal population share and the policy
variable "Yrs. Open". It happens that the correlation between the trade share and Coast Pop. Shr. is very large. Predicted
trade share and trade openness could also be related to each other in two ways if predicted trade share indicates the natural
level of trade. First, a high natural level of trade may make it more likely for the country to adopt more open policies, and
second if a country has a high trade potential (predicted trade share), then openness will bene￿t its growth more than if the
country has low trade potential. We included, therefore, (in a set of GMM estimates not shown here) an interaction term,
the product of predicted trade share with the openness variable. When using the predicted trade share and the openness
variables together with the interaction term, only the predicted trade share is signi￿cant while both the openness variable
and the interaction term attain insigni￿cant coe¢ cients. When the predicted trade share is used with the interaction term,
only the predicted trade share is signi￿cant with the correct sign. When the interaction term is used with Yrs. Open.,
neither one is signi￿cant. Finally, when the interaction term is used alone, it gives a large positive coe¢ cient which is
signi￿cant at ￿ve percent level. We found, therefore, no evidence of multicollinearity driving our results.
24variables (latitude, coastal population share, natural capital, malaria ecology, and the Frankel-Romer
predicted trade share), and social and historical variables (ethnic heterogeneity, the statehist measure
of pre-modern development, colonizing power, religion, and proportions speaking Western European
languages). Our results, especially those obtained when treating them as endogenous, strongly con￿rmed
that good institutions, avoidance of civil wars, and a more open economy, have had signi￿cant positive
e⁄ects on growth in Africa. We also obtain some con￿rmation of Bertocchi and Canova￿ s ￿nding that
having been colonized by Belgium, Italy or Portugal conferred a worse fate than colonization by England
or France, and of the World Bank￿ s 1997 ￿nding that having more natural capital has tended to be
harmful to growth.
Our results contained three major surprises. First, having a larger coastal population share has
signi￿cantly negative e⁄ects on the rate of growth in our African country panel, especially according
to our GMM models but also based on two of the three indirect e⁄ects that are signi￿cant in the ￿rst
stages of our 2SLS models. Thus, we ￿nd no intra-African support for Sachs and Warner￿ s contention
that one reason Africa￿ s countries have grown slowly is that so many of them are landlocked.
Second, contrary to the oft-mentioned idea that proximity to the equator is a disadvantage, in our
African panel the relationship between latitude and economic growth is non-linear, with proximity to the
equator being good for growth over about half of latitude￿ s observed range, and the estimated growth
rate being higher at the equator than in the large majority of the range of latitude observed in the
region. In the four IV regression models in which it proved helpful to include latitude, the coe¢ cients
are also highly signi￿cant and imply that trade openness, political openness, political rights, and absence
of corruption, are at ￿rst decreasing with latitude. The fact that latitude could be excluded from the
2nd stage regressions in four of our ￿ve 2SLS equation systems, which suggests that it a⁄ects growth
only by in￿ uencing institutions or policies, is also of interest.
Third, contrary to Easterly and Levine￿ s hypothesis and their evidence from global regressions to
the e⁄ect that ethnic heterogeneity may account for "Africa￿ s growth tragedy," the ethnic heterogeneity
variable, identical to the main measure of that concept used in their paper, is positively and signi￿cantly
related to economic growth and to favorable institutional and policy outcomes, at least over the range in
which most observations fall, in our Africa-only panel. In all four GMM residual regressions shown, ethnic
heterogeneity is positively related to growth residual, signi￿cant at the 1% level. Ethnic heterogeneity
appears to be a signi￿cant positive determinant of lower corruption and of greater political rights and
shows a signi￿cant convex relationship with political openness with a positive relationship predominant
over the range of ethnic heterogeneity levels in which three quarters of sub-Saharan African countries
fall. A fourth, more minor, surprise is that in contrast with Sala-i-Martin￿ s ￿nding for global samples,
25we ￿nd that a larger Muslim population share is associated with lower rates of growth.
The fact that proximity to the equator is not associated with slower growth within sub-Saharan
Africa does not necessarily contradict the idea that tropical climate helps to explain the region￿ s poor
economic performance relative to other parts of the developing world. Almost all countries in the region
lie mainly if not entirely in the tropics, and relatively tropical climates may still help to account for
relative performance of SSA as a region, our results notwithstanding. However, our results suggest either
that exact degree of proximity to the equator doesn￿ t matter so long as a country is already located
within the geographic tropics, or that whatever it is about a tropical climate that makes economic
growth more di¢ cult is not well proxied by distance from the equator.
One factor helping to account for the surprising relationship between latitude and growth in sub-
Saharan Africa may be the fact that sub-Saharan countries furthest from the equator in a northerly
direction are located in or on the margins of the Sahara desert. There are also major deserts, the
Kalahari and the Namib, well south of the equator, and serious drought frequently plagues the horn
of Africa and other sub-regions of the continent, without obvious correlation with latitude. Temperate
climates are also found in highland regions near the equator, in east and central Africa. Our estimates
suggest that the worst locations for growth are those about 10￿ north or south of the equator, home
to Mali, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, and Somalia, in the north and Malawi in the south among countries
included in our sample. In sum, being tropical may be a factor in slow African economic growth, but
being close to the equator per se is evidently not.
The case of ethnic heterogeneity may be similar to that of latitude in the sense that most sub-Saharan
countries are (as seen above) found near a boundary of that variable￿ s distribution, so the conclusion from
global studies that ethnic heterogeneity is a factor explaining slower economic growth in Africa versus
other regions is not strictly speaking at odds with our ￿nding of a positive correlation between ethnic
heterogeneity and growth within the region. A possible explanation for the apparent discrepancy can
be found in recent contributions, including Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), which suggest that the
true global relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and economic growth is U-shaped because having
a few large, competing ethnic groups may be worse than having many small ones. African examples
are not hard to come by: compare, for instance, the relative ethnic calm of Tanzania, where none of
more than 100 ethnic groups accounts for more than 10% of the population, to the unrest in neighboring
Rwanda and Kenya, with two and a few dominant ethnic groups, respectively. Nor is having a single
predominant ethnic group a guarantee against political instability and violence, as the case of Somalia
tragically illustrates. We found evidence for the same U-shaped relationship in one of our 1st stage
regressions in Section 3.2. Our estimated coe¢ cients on Ethnic heterogeneiety and its square in that
26regression imply that Political Openness, an institutional condition favorable to economic growth, is an
increasing function of Ethnic heterogeneity for values of the latter exceeding 0.33.49
Suppose that the true global relationship between GDP growth and ethnic heterogeneity is U-shaped
but turns upwards only for the highest third of observed ethnic heterogeneity values. Then there is no
contradiction if estimates over a global sample that use a linear speci￿cation ￿nd a signi￿cant negative
coe¢ cient on ethnic heterogeneity, while estimates over a sample of African countries using such a
speci￿cation ￿nd a signi￿cant positive coe¢ cient. The estimated coe¢ cients on Ethnic heterogeneity
and its square in our 1st stage regression for Political Openness imply that Political Openness is lower for
ethnically heterogeneous countries until Ethnic Heterogeneity reaches about 0.67, a value above which
most sub-Saharan African countries but few other countries globally are found (see the Supplemental
Appendix). The practical implication is that it may be African countries with lower not higher levels
of ethnic diversity that are most in need of e⁄orts to reduce grievances and increase participation by
all groups in the making and implementation of national policies, taking their cue from the success of
Tanzania￿ s e⁄orts to mitigate tribalism (Miguel, 2004).
Whereas explanations of the surprise ￿ndings regarding latitude and ethnic heterogeneity may be
related to the distinctive ranges that African countries occupy with respect to those variables, our ￿nding
that larger coastal populations are negatively associated with growth in sub-Saharan Africa requires a
qualitatively di⁄erent kind of explanation. It is often remarked that Africa has the smallest ratio of
coastline to area of any continent, and that it is relatively lacking in good natural harbors. Not only
does the continent have many landlocked countries, but also in countries with coastlines, population
tends to be denser away from the sea, where agricultural conditions are better. Bloom and Sachs (1998)
note the absence of large rivers navigable by ocean-going ships and cite Adam Smith￿ s observation that
￿There are in Africa none of those great inlets, such as the Baltic and Adriatic seas in Europe, the
Mediterranean and Euxine (Black) seas in both Europe and Asia, and the gulfs of Arabia, Persia, India,
Bengal, and Siam, in Asia, to carry maritime commerce into the interior parts of that great continent.￿
Such natural disadvantages do not, in our opinion, provide a complete explanation of why presence of
coastal population fails to register a positive e⁄ect on growth, in our sample. Our ￿nding suggests that
on the whole, African countries that have coastlines have yet to reap most of the trading advantages that
these might one day give them. Exceptionally high costs and low e¢ ciency in African ports are probably
49As mentioned in note 38 above, a quadratic speci￿cation for Ethnic heterogeneity also performs well (in terms of
individual and joint signi￿cance and a Ramsey test) in a ￿rst-stage regression for Political Rights but was rejected due to
failure to meet criteria for good instruments. The estimated coe¢ cients, -7.54 for Ethnic heterogeneity and 9.52 for its
square, imply that more Ethnic heterogeneity is better for Political Rights once Ethnic heterogeneity exceeds 0.40, slightly
higher than the 0.33 turning point implied by the estimates in the Political Openness regression. Taking into account the
slightly di⁄erent set of countries included in the Political Rights regression, the percentage of included countries in the
relevant range (above 0.4) remains almost identical, at 76%.
27part of the explanation (Bloom and Sachs, 1998; Clark, Dollar and Micco, 2004). Other problems which
have thus far prevented the growth of most export-oriented manufacturing are undoubtedly also at play.
Finally, a long-term cost born by African coastal areas as a consequence of the slave trade may also be
at work (Nunn, 2008).
Our ￿ndings suggest that the message of Sachs and Warner (1997) and Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger
(1999) that sub-Saharan Africa￿ s poor growth performance may in part be attributable to having many
countries that are landlocked must at a minimum be amended by noting that sub-Saharan countries
that have larger coastal population shares have yet to grow faster than those that have little coastal
population or are landlocked. That the sub-Saharan region may be the only part of the world in which
access by ocean-going vessels has been of little or no bene￿t stands out as especially noteworthy among
our paper￿ s ￿ndings.
We introduced a variable not previously focused on in the African context, state history, and we
found its inclusion to be statistically warranted and often important in both our GMM and our IV
models. In the GMM residual estimates, a longer state history always predicts faster growth, signi￿cant
at the 1% level. In the IV models, statehist01 was found to be a highly signi￿cant predictor of openness
and absence of corruption, and in the equation system for political rights it is a direct positive predictor
of the growth rate.50 Its positive association with the growth rate and its negative association with
corruption are consistent with the previous ￿ndings of Bockstette et al. for world samples.51
Most of these results were con￿rmed by both our GMM and residuals approach and our two-stage
least squares analysis, but the latter approach suggests a more speci￿c interrelation among the causal
factors, namely that policies and institutions like the existence of greater corruption or more frequent
civil wars, while often important as proximate causes of which countries make progress and which fail
to do so, are to a signi￿cant degree caused by longer term processes and more exogenous geographical
and demographic facts.52
How might we view these results if concerned about the near-term prospects of Africa￿ s economies?
On the positive side we count the fact that geographic and demographic factors like equatorial and
inland location and ethnic heterogeneity do not seem to be bars to growth in their own rights, and
that changing policies on trade and creating greater political openness and lessening corruption appear
50Statehist is not included in the predicting of political openness since its inclusion in the set of instruments violates the
endogeneity and over-identifying restrictions tests.
51See also Chanda and Putterman (2005). Gennaioli and Rainer (2005) ￿nd a positive association between the degree of
centralization of African tribes before colonization and measures of the success of provision of certain public goods including
paved roads and lower infant mortality during the early post-colonial period.
52Masanjala and Papageorgiou (2006) have generated evidence that the determinants of growth in Africa and in the rest
of the world may be di⁄erent but have not provided speci￿c estimates of what the relationships in question are. Conducting
the same exercises for a world sample and con￿rming that the coe¢ cients for African countries are signi￿cantly di⁄erent is
a desirable further step for our project.
28capable of facilitating economic growth. On the negative side, the social, cultural and historical legacies
at work in many countries of the region may make the creation of high quality institutions and policies
a challenging, though one can hope not impossible, task. Our con￿rmation of the importance of those
institutions suggests to us that studying what does and doesn￿ t work in the area of capacity building in
public, private, and civil spheres in Africa is one of the most important directions for future research.
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33Appendix 1: Variable de￿nitions and sources
Civil wars: A dummy variable indicating whether the country is at war. It only considers internal wars which
resulted in at least 1000 battle related deaths (civilian and military) per year. Data are from Azam and Hoe› er
(2002) and were used in Collier and Hoe› er (2002).
Coast Pop. Shr. (Coastal population share): Measures the ratio of population within 100 km of
ice-free coast to total population. Calculated using 100 kilometers from ice-free coast bu⁄er (source: Gallup,
Sachs with Mellinger (1999)).
Absence of Corruption: Based on the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from Transparency International
(2003) (source: www.Transparency.org).
Eng. Col. (English Colony dummy): Dummy variable indicating that country was a British colony
(source: La Porta et al., (1999)).
Eth. Heter. (Ethnic heterogeneity): The average of ￿ve di⁄erent indices of ethno-linguistic fractional-
ization. Gives the probability of two random people in a country not speaking a same language.
Eth. Heter. sq. (Ethnic heterogeneity squared): See Ethnic heterogeneity.
Eur. Lng. Shr. (European language share): Measures the fraction of the population speaking one of
￿ve major Western European languages, including English, as mother tongue (source: Hall and Jones (1999)).
Gr(GDPpc) (Growth rate of GDP per capita): Measures the annual percentage growth rate of GDP
per capita based on constant local currency (source: World development indicators).
Latitude: Measures the absolute value of the latitude of the country, where zero is the equator (source: La
Porta et al (1999)).
Latitude. sq (Latitude squared): See Latitude.
Log(I/GDP) (Investment share of GDP): Measures the natural log of investment-to-GDP ratio (source:
World development indicators).
Log iGDPpc (Log of initial GDP per capita): Measures the natural log of real gross domestic product
per capita in the ￿rst year of the ￿ve year period under observation (source: Own computations based on data
from World development indicators).
Malaria Ecol. (Malaria Ecology): A measure of ecological factors associated with the risk of contracting
malaria, used in place of actual malaria incidence in order to eliminate possible in￿ uences of country income on
it. The basic formula for ME includes temperature, species abundance, and vector type (source: Kiszewski et al.
(2004)).
Natural Cap. (Natural Capital): Measures the value of a country￿ s agricultural lands, pasture lands, forests
and subsoil resources including metals, minerals, coal, oil and natural gas (source: World Bank, Environmentally
Sustainable Development Studies and Monographs Series, #17, June (1997)).
34Other Col. (Other Colony dummy): Dummy variable indicating that country was a Belgian, Italian,
Portuguese or German colony. Germany is not represented in our data due to missing observations and the coding
of former German colonies under whichever power controlled them after World War I. (source: La Porta et al.,
(1999).
Percent Muslim: Measures the percentage of the population that belonged to the Muslim faith in 1980 (or
1990-95 for countries formed more recently) (source: La Porta et al., (1999)).
Polit. Open. (Political Openness): Measures the general openness of political institutions. This index
ranges from 0-10, where 10 denote a highly open regime. It is the variable that is called "democracy" in the
Polity IV data set and is also referred to as "democracy" by Collier and Hoe› er (2002) and is used by Azam and
Hoe› er (2002).
Polit. Rights (Political Rights): An average of an index of political rights and an index of civil liberties from
Freedom House (2003), www.freedomhouse.org. Political rights include the right to vote, the right to compete for
a public o¢ ce; while civil liberties include the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational
rights, rule of law and personal autonomy without interference from the state. Data are from an annual survey
and are available since 1978 for 198 countries.
Pred. Trd. Shr. (Log of Predicted Trade Share): Measures the natural log of the Frankel-Romer
predicted trade share. The predicted trade share is computed from a gravity model based only on population and
geography (source: Frankel, Romer and Cyrus (1996)).
Relig. Frac. (Religious fractionalization index): Ranges from 0 to 100. A value of zero indicates
that the society is completely homogenous whereas a value of 100 would characterize a completely heterogeneous
society (source: Collier and Hoe› er (2002)).
Sec. Enrol (Secondary School Enrollment Ratio.): Average years of schooling for those 25 years old
and over (source: Barro and Lee(2000)).
Statehist01 (State history index): Measures the proportion of years from 1 to 1950 C.E. in which there
were one or more state level polities, whether they were indigenous or imposed, and the proportion of the territory
they encompassed, discounting backward at a 1% rate for each half century. An updated version of the index used
in Bockestette et al., 2002 (source Putterman, (2004)).
Yrs. Open (Years Open): Measures the fraction of years during the period 1950 to 1994 that the economy
has been open according to criteria proposed by Sachs and Warner, which include (1) average tari⁄ rate below
40%, (2) less than 40% of imports covered by quotas and licensing, (3) black market premium below 20%, (4)
absence of extreme controls on exports, and (5) absence of a socialist economy. It is measured on a scale from 0￿ 1
(source: Sachs and Warner, (1997)).
35Appendix 2: Summary statistics.
Variable Number Obs. Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Civil Wars 272 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
Coast Pop. Shr. 264 0.21 0.23 0.00 0.67
Absence of Corruption 184 2.74 0.93 1.60 6.00
Eng. Col. 272 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00
Eth. Heter. 272 0.61 0.28 0.00 0.87
Eth. Heter. sq. 272 0.45 0.26 0.00 0.76
Eur. Lng. Shr. 272 0.02 0.10 0.00 0.57
Gr(GDPpc) 272 0.82 3.41 -10.90 17.20
Latitude 264 11.12 7.25 0.23 29.59
Latitude. sq. 264 175.89 200.88 0.05 875.86
Log iGDPpc 272 6.77 0.58 5.42 8.83
Log(I/GDP) 262 2.79 0.45 1.07 3.96
Malaria Ecol. 272 14.96 9.12 0.00 32.20
Natural Cap. 216 3958.1 2614.9 880 12340
Other Col. 272 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00
Percent Muslim 272 29.54 33.01 0.00 99.80
Polit. Open. 258 1.70 2.85 0.00 10.00
Polit. Rights 198 2.74 1.35 1.00 6.50
Pred. Trd. Shr. 272 2.96 0.51 2.16 4.04
Relig. Frac. 272 55.38 16.72 1.00 74.00
Sec. Enrol 198 2.38 1.51 0.00 6.28
Statehist01 264 0.20 0.18 0.01 0.81
Yrs. Open 264 0.11 0.20 0.00 1.00
Note: Includes all observations that enter the regressions of section 3.1 and/or 3.2.
36Appendix 3: Country Inclusion by Regression
Tables/ Columns/ Countries
Table 1 Table 2 Table 3a Table3b
1 2 3 4
# 24 24 24 33
Benin ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Botswana ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Burkina F. ￿
Burundi ￿
Cameroon ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Centr. A. R. ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Chad ￿
Congo ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
D. R. Congo ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Gabon ￿
Gambia ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Ghana ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Guinea-Bis. ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Madagascar ￿
Ivory Coast ￿
Kenya ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Liberia ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Malawi ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Mali ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Mauritania ￿
Mauritius ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Niger ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Nigeria ￿
Rwanda ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Senegal ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Sierra Leone ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Somalia ￿
Sudan ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Swaziland ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Togo ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Uganda ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Zambia ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Zimbabwe ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
1 2 3 4
28 28 25 20
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿












￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
1 2 3 4 5 6
24 24 24 24 25 25
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
1 2 3 4
26 26 17 17
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Note: # refers to the number of countries in a column of a particular table. ￿ indicates that an observation for the
country listed in the row heading is included in the designated regression. Countries are excluded from
regression if data are not available for some of the variables included.
37Appendix 4: Second Stage Regressions for GMM Residuals with Quadratic Ethnic
Dependent Variable: GMM Residuals


















































































































# Obs 173 167 140 117
# Countries 30 29 24 20
Note: Entries for variables in this table are estimated coe¢ cients followed by standard errors,
in parentheses, and*, **and *** indicate signi￿cance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively. In brackets are
P-values for the Ramsey Test. According to the estimates, for all or most values of ethnic heterogeneity
(for columns 1 and 2, values up to 0.7), the rate of economic growth is increasing as ethnic heterogeneity
increases, and for all estimates, the rate of growth is higher at maximum ethnic heterogeneity value 1.0 than at
minimum ethnic heterogeneity value 0.
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